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I
ndependent federal agencies occupy a special constitutional posi-
tion in the governmental structure.  Their stock-in-trade is the 
expert, apolitical resolution of regulatory issues.  They are sup-
posedly “independent” of the political will of the executive branch.  
Because most are multi-member organizations, they are also per-
ceived as accommodating diverse views and able to prevent extreme 
outcomes through the compromise inherent in the process of collegial 
decision-making.  But such a view is not universally held.  A well-
known examination of such agencies in the 1930s described them 
uncharitably as a “headless ‘fourth branch’ of government, a haphaz-
ard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers.”1  
Most modern independent agencies, in fact, are not simply 
impartial government referees.  Nonetheless, as Justice Breyer has 
suggested, they possess “comparative freedom from ballot box con-
trol”2 and “enjoy an independence expressly designed to insulate 
them, to a degree, from the ‘exercise of political oversight . . .’” that 
affects cabinet or cabinetlike executive agencies.3  So, precisely what 
is the place of independent agencies today, and what does their role 
in the governmental structure mean for public lawyers?
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The Advent of Federal 
Independent Agencies and 
Railroad Regulation in Britain 
The modern independent agency at 
the federal level emerged in 1887 when 
Congress established the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC).  But the 
ICC had its forebearers.  Britain exam-
ined railroad regulation as early as 
the 1830s, in response to shipper com-
plaints about monopoly practices.  
The British Railway Regulation Bill 
of 1840 attempted to delegate power 
over railways to a government depart-
ment, the Board of Trade, but it was an 
ineffectual statute.  It required railways 
to give the Board of Trade notice before 
opening a new line, but the board 
lacked power to prevent operation.  
The board could also entertain com-
plaints but, signiicantly, lacked power 
to pursue them.  For the next 32 years, 
Parliament tried unsuccessfully to reg-
ulate the railroad industry. 
In 1872, yet another parliamentary 
committee reviewed over 30 years of 
British rail regulation.  It once again 
concluded that marketplace competi-
tion was unsuccessful.  As to how to 
remedy this situation, the committee 
reviewed several options.  It believed 
that judicial enforcement of competi-
tion statutes was too expensive and 
that the courts, in any event, lacked 
expertise in railway matters.  Direct 
oversight by parliamentary commit-
tees was likewise seen as ineffective.  
Finally, the committee believed that 
oversight by a cabinet department, i.e., 
the Board of Trade, lacked the proce-
dural protections of the judicial model. 
So, to some extent as a default posi-
tion, the committee recommended 
creation of a tribunal to supervise the 
railways, with authority to hear com-
plaints from customers and provide 
remedies, and otherwise enforce laws 
relating to the railways.  Composed of 
at least three members, the new com-
mission would include “an eminent 
lawyer” and another “acquainted 
with railway management.”4  Parlia-
ment created the new commission on 
a temporary basis in 1872 and made 
it permanent in 1888 — nearly a half-
century after regulatory efforts began.
U.S. Railroad Regulation 
Railroad regulation emerged in the 
United States shortly after British reg-
ulation.  The impetus for government 
oversight was the brainchild of Charles 
Francis Adams Jr.  Between 1866 and 
1878, he wrote several inluential arti-
cles about the economics of railroad 
operation, including Chapters of Erie, 
and Other Essays, a muckraking book 
coauthored with his brother Henry.  
They argued that the railroads, if 
unsupervised, would become natural 
monopolies but that government oper-
ation of railroads or regulation would 
stile eficiency and innovation.  Their 
remedy was creation of a so-called 
sunshine commission, i.e., an impartial 
body of experts that would investi-
gate, examine and report on railroad 
activities, but not have enforcement 
power.5  Some states adopted this for-
mat, including Massachusetts, where 
Adams served as one of its irst three 
commissioners.  Other states set up 
commissions with signiicant pow-
ers.  The irst was the Illinois Railroad 
and Warehouse Commission, estab-
lished in 1871. By 1886, a year before 
the creation of the ICC, 30 of the 38 
states then in existence had some form 
of railroad regulation, and 25 used the 
commission form. 
Congress was well aware of the 
experience of both the British and the 
individual states.  The statute creating 
the ICC6 intended to create a commis-
sion with a degree of expertise and 
independence.  Commissioners were 
appointed by the president with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, and 
they served staggered terms that were 
longer than that of the president. Com-
missioners were somewhat insulated 
from direct presidential supervision 
by the act’s removal provision for 
“ineficiency, neglect of duty, or mal-
feasance in ofice,” a core element of 
numerous independent agency stat-
utes today.  One scholar points out that 
initial appointments to the ICC came 
mostly from the public sector rather 
than the railroad industry, in an effort 
to limit industry control.7 Another 
scholar argues that, nonetheless, those 
appointed were plainly sympathetic to 
the railroads.8 
With little discretionary power at 
the outset, the ICC was weak and 
ineffectual until Congress passed the 
Hepburn Act in 1906,9 which gave the 
ICC rate-making authority.  The pas-
sage of the Hepburn Act was part of 
the Progressive Movement. In the view 
of Progressives, it was essential for 
expert administrators with technical 
competence in the various areas of reg-
ulation to staff independent regulatory 
commissions.
Appointments: Industry 
Representatives Versus Neutrals 
Since the Progressive Era, a range of 
factors other than expertise has inlu-
enced appointments to independent 
agencies.  The National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) is an illustration.  
The Wagner Act created the NLRB 
as a statutory agency in 1935.10  The 
board had three members.11  Presi-
dent Roosevelt appointed as its irst 
three members the following: J. War-
ren Madden, chair, a Professor at the 
University of Pittsburgh School of 
Law; John M. Carmody, a federal gov-
ernment oficial; and Edwin S. Smith, 
a former commissioner of the Mas-
sachusetts Department of Labor and 
Industries.  Some members of Con-
gress wanted a board independent of 
political control, while others preferred 
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a board composed of representatives 
of industry and labor. Congress even-
tually created a board that remained 
essentially neutral for 18 years, with 
members coming largely from aca-
demia or government.  In 1952, 
however, President Eisenhower — the 
irst Republican elected since pas-
sage of the Wagner Act — appointed 
management-oriented members to the 
board.  Starting with President Nixon 
in 1970, members have been chosen 
largely for their management or union 
backgrounds.   
By the 1960s, the “theoretical under-
pinnings of administrative expertise 
had been largely undermined.”12  
The administrative process was 
increasingly seen less as a forum for 
ascertaining the public interest and 
more as a forum for interest represen-
tation. As Harvard law professor Mark 
Tushnet explained, “[i]nterest-group 
bargaining — a form of politics — was 
relocated into administrative agencies, 
and the Progressive claim that admin-
istrative agencies pursued science 
rather than politics became dificult to 
sustain.”13  
The Inluence of the President 
and Congress
Independent agencies today undertake 
signiicant regulatory and adminis-
trative roles within a broader tug and 
tussle of interbranch tension.  The 
president’s constitutional appointment 
and removal powers have been lim-
ited by Congress, with approval from 
the Supreme Court.14 Nonetheless, the 
president retains considerable power 
over agency membership — and, 
hence, inluence over agency policy 
direction under highly discretionary 
statutes — through his appointment 
(and re-appointment) power, espe-
cially the selection of agency chairs, 
who are almost always the agency’s 
most signiicant members.  And, bol-
stered largely by custom, the president 
even retains inluence in prodding 
unwanted independent agency mem-
bers from ofice.   
Congress likewise holds signii-
cant powers.  As a bipartisan group of 
senators and congressmen reminded 
President Carter in 1977, “Congress, 
and not the executive, controls the 
guidelines for independent regula-
tory agencies.  Congress created these 
agencies.  Congress provided for their 
organization. Congress adopted their 
statutory mandates.  Congress controls 
their budgets and oversees their per-
formance.  Congress speciies agency 
procedures.”15  Indeed, some today 
think that Congress, perhaps more 
than the president, is now the pri-
mary inluence on most independent 
agencies.         
Agency Independence and the 
Consumer Finance Protection 
Bureau
A wide variety of hypotheses about 
agency independence exists. But 
practical rather than theoretical consid-
erations motivated the creation of the 
irst independent agency, the ICC, and 
practical considerations continue to 
dominate the structure and function-
ing of independent agencies.  
Creation of the Consumer Finance 
Protection Bureau by the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 is a recent 
illustration.16 
Harvard law professor Elizabeth 
Warren introduced in a 2007 article 
the idea of an agency that would reg-
ulate consumer inancial products.17  
She argued that a model based on the 
multi-member Consumer Product 
Safety Commission, which had pro-
tected consumers from purchasing 
defective or dangerous goods through 
uniform safety standards and regu-
lation, would be just as useful in the 
inancial products market.  In 2009, 
Chairman Barney Frank of the House 
Financial Services Committee intro-
duced legislation that would set up a 
typical ive-member independent reg-
ulatory commission.18  Later that year, 
he tried again with legislation that 
retained the independent commission 
concept but provided, signiicantly, 
that the new agency would be funded 
through the Federal Reserve Board. 
He proposed that 10 percent of the 
federal government’s budget go auto-
matically to the new agency every 
year, thus depriving both Congress 
and the administration of their usual 
appropriations oversight powers.19  
In the Senate, Chairman Christopher 
Dodd of the Senate Banking Commit-
tee introduced in 2010 his version of 
inancial protection legislation, which  
differed in certain respects from the 
House version. Dodd proposed an 
agency headed by a single director 
appointed to a ive-year term with the 
usual statutory removal protection.  
But the agency would be a bureau 
of the Federal Reserve Board funded 
through the Federal Reserve System.  
To ensure the new bureau’s inde-
pendence, the Federal Reserve was 
statutorily prohibited from exercis-
ing any control over it.20  The bureau’s 
only connection to the federal gov-
ernment is the funding mechanism.  
President Obama signed the Dodd-
Frank bill into law in 2010.21 
Republicans were concerned that 
they would lose important political 
inluence over the new agency if it had 
only a single individual at its head 
and a genuinely autonomous revenue 
stream.  A key conceptual objection to 
the new agency was its lack of demo-
cratic accountability.  The legislation 
creating it was described as an effort to 
“hyperdepoliticize” the agency.22  
Although it seems that the text of 
Dodd-Frank sought to insulate the 
new bureau from politics, this does not 
mean that the president or Congress 
lacks ways of inluencing the bureau’s 
regulatory and enforcement activ-
ity.  The president’s inluence comes 
from his ability to nominate a single 
director to a ive-year term.  How-
ever, this inluence can be thwarted 
by Congress.  As an extreme response, 
a hostile Congress, especially if sup-
ported by a new administration, can 
revise the agency’s statutory mandate 
or even abolish the agency entirely.23  
More likely, the Senate, through its 
conirmation authority, can delay, 
if not defeat, a president’s choice of 
director.  Indeed, that happened with 
Senate approval of the bureau’s irst 
director.  President Obama nomi-
nated former Ohio Attorney General 
Richard Cordray in July 2011, but 
Republican efforts to alter the agen-
cy’s structure by replacing the director 
with a multi-member board initially 
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stiled Cordray’s approval.  President 
Obama skirted Republican objection 
by giving Cordray a recess appoint-
ment.  NLRB v. Noel Canning  declared 
such recess appointments illegal (Pres-
ident Obama also made three to the 
National Labor Relations Board).24  It 
took two years before Cordray was 
conirmed as part of a package deal in 
which Republicans agreed to vote on 
Cordray’s nomination, and that of two 
NLRB members, in exchange for Presi-
dent Obama’s agreement to withdraw 
two additional recess appointments to 
the NLRB.25      
Conlicting Constitutional 
Theories of Independent 
Agencies 
The constitutionality of the inde-
pendent agency was not an issue 
of considerable debate until many 
decades after establishment of the 
ICC.  Now, two conlicting constitu-
tional theories compete for dominance. 
Some observers believe that indepen-
dent agencies must be considered as 
part of a unitary executive supervised 
at the top by the president.  The presi-
dent, after all, must constitutionally 
“take care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”26  The argument suggests 
that this duty can be discharged only 
if agencies performing executive func-
tions are understood to be agents of 
the president and responsible to him. 
Any other structure would undermine 
accountability.  Others argue for per-
meability among the branches.  They 
claim that Congress may, by statute, 
adjust or alter a strict tripartite division 
of federal power as long as it does not 
undermine a core function of another 
branch or “alter the balance of author-
ity” among the branches.27  Supreme 
Court decisions have not consistently 
applied a particular approach or the-
ory.  Rather, they apply a literal or 
functional approach depending on 
circumstances.   
Professor Colin Diver suggests that 
“the history of the administrative state 
is an unending contest between Con-
gress and the President for control 
of the bureaucracy.”28  Public law-
yers must operate in this environment 
that melds the conlicting goals of 
political accountability and indepen-
dent expertise.  Government lawyers 
must continue the historic tradition 
of acquiring and retaining expertise 
based on long service and experi-
ence and bring that expertise to bear 
unencumbered by partisan or per-
sonal bias. At the same time, absent 
unusual circumstances, public lawyers 
must remain faithful to the elected or 
appointed policy makers who, by vir-
tue of their election or appointment, 
are accountable to the public and 
thus possess legitimacy in our con-
stitutional system.  Maintaining that 
balance can be dificult in a regulatory 
regime governed by statutory texts 
that are often ambiguous and that can 
be read literally or in historical context. 
Upholding that balance is the responsi-
bility of the public lawyer. n
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